Welcome to the special issue that focuses on the theme of self-cultivation in the East Asian philosophy of education. The cultivation of the self is always an issue of ultimate concern in the East Asian educational tradition. Thousands of years ago, Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi, Laozi, Zhuangzi and many other ancient philosophers all pondered on the meaning of being a person—what kind of a human being one should be and how one should develop oneself to be such a person. Their legacy has produced a unique domain of Chinese or Confucian cultural heritage in East Asia. The question concerning the self could be unpacked from different aspects. First, the tradition of Chinese philosophy has emphasised the emulation of model characters, including junzi (benevolent or noble person) and shenren (the sage), as the goals of education. However, some interesting questions are involved. Confucian and Daoist philosophers both adopt the term shenren, but they may have different references. Does the divergence lead to different educational ideas and practices? Moreover, what is the difference between self-conception in Confucian and Daoist traditions, and between them and Buddhist thought? Do the conceptions of junzi and shenren still affect current education in Confucian cultural heritage societies? Are these concepts still taken as the points of destination of modern education? On the other hand, it may be the case that the meanings of the conceptions of junzi and shenren are modernised in some sense. In this regard, the question of what change could be made in the understanding of self-conception and education has to be explored. Probing even further, the archaic conceptions of junzi and shenren could already be abandoned in modern times. Thus, what kind of human being is taken to replace the archaic conceptions as the destination of humanistic education in the modern era that is facing the thrust of globalisation and internationalisation? Expressed in a more radical way, do the descendants of Confucius, in blood or in spirit, still need an ideal human being for their education?
Second, the area influenced by the tradition of Chinese philosophy is much larger than China in the political-geographical sense. Local and temporal characteristics may produce differences in the conception of self in various regions. In the sphere of pre-modern Chinese cultural heritage, the ideal Confucian person had different names. In ancient China, the Confucian literati were called shidaifu. In Tokugawa Japan (1600–1868), they were called jusha; and in Chosen Korea, they were yangban (Huang, Citation2010).The different conceptions of the Confucian literati from various areas imply both similarities and dissimilarities, which indicate the complicated processes of how the Confucian human person is cultivated in each area with local characteristics.
The perfectibility of the human being as the cultivation of the self has been thought to be the common core value of the multifaceted East Asian Confucian humanism for a thousand years (Huang, Citation2010). This special issue’s eight-article collection addresses a wide range of issues in relation to self-cultivation from the East Asian perspective with diverse, creative and critical views.
Chi-Ming Lam’s ‘Confucianism and Critical Rationalism: Friends or Foes’ lends a new lens for viewing Confucianism. Lam compares Confucianism with rationalism and explores their differences and compatibilities. In the beginning of the article, Lam raises a very interesting question about whether or not Confucianism can be critical. As Confucius characterises the hierarchical structure of a harmonious society, it seems to suggest that Confucianism tends to cultivate ‘a conformist rather than critical mind’. However, Lam argues that in Confucianism, criticality plays a key role in self-cultivation. Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi all agree that a junzi should be critical to himself and others regarding learning. This interpretation may contradict our current understanding of Confucianism in relation to the concept of harmony. Since Hu Jintao, the former president of China, launched the new slogan, ‘harmonious socialist society’ in 2005 (Choukroune & Garapon, Citation2007; Doutournier & Zhe, Citation2009), the concept of harmony has been politicised. It is used as a means to silence different opinions in the society because a harmonious society is assumed to reach agreement or consensus rather than conduct debates. Lam has a very stimulating view about harmony: ‘So far as the role of criticism in Confucianism is concerned, it is to foster harmony between people of diverse backgrounds in the local and international community’. ‘Harmony in diversity’ is interpreted as the ultimate goal of Confucianism. This view is based on Confucius’ words: ‘The gentleman agrees with others without being an echo [heerbutong 和而不同]’. Here, Lam adopts Lau’s (Citation1992) translation of 君子和而不同. Nevertheless, Legge’s (Citation1861) translation reminds me of a different connotation: ‘The superior man is affable, but not adulatory’. Lau’s translation focuses on the substantial content of the agreement or the disagreement. In contrast, Legge’s translation stresses the person’s attitude or manner. Different translations have varying implications. On this point, I think there is still much to explore about the ‘diverse harmony’. Lam concludes with three major differences between Confucianism and critical rationalism and thereby suggests a possible reconciliation. Lam’s article shows the potential of Confucianism in the modern age in the sense that the goal of the Confucian self-cultivation is to create a person who practises not only ethical virtues, especially ren (benevolence), but also critical thinking.
‘Is Filial Piety a Virtue? A Reading of the Xiao Jing (Classic of Filial Piety) from the Perspective of Ideology Critique’ authored by Hektor Yan starts with a very fascinating question: Is filial piety a virtue? Among all virtues, filial piety is held in the highest esteem in Chinese culture and tradition. In imperial China, filial piety was one of the most important virtues for the ruler to justify his power to govern. Even in modern times, political leaders in Chinese heritage cultures still claim the importance of the Confucian virtues (de). A ruler with de would gain the people’s trust and support and win the consent and loyalty of his subjects. Yan applies Gramsci’s (Citation1992) insight on hegemony to de in the Chinese moral-political context to reveal that filial piety can be powerfully effective. Filial piety is generally understood as children’s obedience and servitude to their parents. In imperial China, it was extended to the subjects’ obedience and servitude to their rulers—in a blind and rigid way; therefore, it is criticised. By adopting Yu’s (Citation2013) view, Yan argues that filial piety can be a virtue ‘that requires critical reasoning and it is believed to be pertinent to various social roles and other interpersonal exchanges’. However, Yan acknowledges that the emphasis on critical reasoning is not easy to accommodate with another element of filial piety, which is the tendency of naturalisation. The author issues a warning in his conclusion. When the virtue of filial piety is taken as something natural to human society in a hierarchical way, it can function to maintain the hegemony of rulers.
Weili Zhao and Caiping Sun’s paper entitled ‘“Keep off the Lawn; Grass Has a Life Too!”: Re-invoking a Daoist Ecological Sensibility for Moral Education in China’s Primary Schools’ provides the introduction of Daoist ecological moral education in the modern world. The authors argue that the concept of co-being contributes to the formation of a Daoist ecological sensibility in children’s moral education. Their argument can be divided into two parts: the theoretical discussion and the analysis of textbooks. At the theoretical level, the authors use the popular park sign ‘Keep off the Lawn; Grass Has a Life Too!’ to demonstrate an age-old Chinese ecological and philosophical belief that human beings live harmoniously and equally with other living creatures on earth. This is a Daoist belief in the unity of human beings and nature. Zhao and Sun also employ Heidegger’s (Citation1969, 1977, 1978) relational thinking and the concept of co-being to enrich the Daoist ecological view. As the authors explain, the Daoist–Heideggerian idea of co-being can lend a lens to examine educational theory and practice. China’s 2002 Curriculum Standards and textbooks are the main subject matters of analysis. The analysis reveals that the ethical position implied in the standards and the textbooks is actually egoistic and instrumental, not reciprocal, egalitarian and interpersonal. Many educational materials claim environmental friendliness. However, as the authors aptly point out, such nature-friendly vocabularies hidden in the post-2001 textbooks assume a hierarchical and dominant thinking that human beings are the masters and owners of the natural environment. Thus, children are taught to build a relationship with others in the way of hierarchical subject–object duality, which is against the Daoist–Heideggerian ecological sensibility. However, the ecological-unfriendliness of the post-2001 textbooks was under review and revision. China’s primary school textbooks published in 2016 are redesigned, and the concept of ecological co-being is highlighted. The authors’ study shows that the tone of instrumental and subject-object oppositional thinking is minimised in the newly published textbooks and replaced with the accent of co-being. Phrases such as ‘playing with the wind’ or ‘thanking our Nature for giving humans presents’ are found in the textbooks. The implication is no longer the human-master but the co-existence of the human being and nature. Overall, this article presents a promising future of moral education with regard to the Daoist ecological sensibility in China.
Michael Dufresne’s creative article, ‘The Illusion of Teaching and Learning: Zhuangzi, Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Language’ shows the insightful communication between Eastern and Western philosophies that presents a new way of understanding teaching and learning. The author argues that the process of learning and teaching is not about transmitting knowledge but about cultivating contextually appropriate habits with the inspirations of Zhuangzi (Graham, Citation1989) and Wittgenstein (Citation1997, 2001). His article begins with Zhuangzi’s anecdote about Wheelwright Pian. Next, Dufresne poses a thought-provoking question about the possibility that there is nothing to be taught or learned in pedagogical practices. Based on Zhuangzi’s view, it is not possible to teach something to those who have no ‘knack’ for it. Dufresne points out that ‘only those who have the right “stuff” can actually be taught’. What is the ‘knack’ or the ‘right stuff’? Zhuangzi offers no clear answer. Dufresne relates Zhuangzi’s ‘knack’ to ‘sudden understanding’ in Wittgenstein’s words. According to Wittgenstein, there is no standard way of teaching and learning. Therefore, there is no rule to be taught or learned. One person cannot learn by following and applying rules because rules are open to interpretation. Furthermore, interpretation relies on words, that is, language, which is foundationless and groundless. Rather, language depends on the convention and the context. According to Dufresne, neither Zhuangzi nor Wittgenstein believes the essence of language or truth. The meaning of words always increase and change in various contexts. Overall, Zhuangzi’s ‘knack’ or the ‘right stuff’, or Wittgenstein’s ‘sudden understanding’ comes from ordinary daily language use, which is related to habit formation. Dufresne thus suggests that, for educators, it is more practical to provide learners with concrete examples and to help them develop appropriate habits than to teach them general rules.
Seungho Moon’s distinctive article, ‘Donghak (Eastern Learning), Self-Other, and Social Transformation: Towards Diverse Curriculum Discourses on Equity and Justice’ discusses the meaning of self-cultivation against the background of Donghak and its implications for contemporary curriculum theory. Donghak was a Neo-Confucian movement founded by Choi Je-u (1824–1864) in 1860 in Korea. Donghak, literally meaning Eastern learning as a reaction to Western learning, calls for both reform and revival of Confucianism. The doctrine of Donghak as an academic movement integrates ideas concerning theology, philosophy and social activism. Moon outlines Donghak by explaining three concepts: Shi-chun-ju (‘everyone serves God within himself or herself’), Sushim-junggi (self-cultivation) and Gae-byeok (building of a new world). The three concepts are indeed interrelated in the sense that the practice of self-cultivation is the process of serving God to attain the goal of building a harmonious new world—Dong-gui-il-che (the cosmological community). Based on this concept, Moon argues that the teaching of Donghak sheds light on examining the current curriculum in three aspects: the self-other hierarchical binary, the purpose of learning, and the eco-centred curriculum. As Moon explains, in the context of Donghak, everyone as a servant of the God is an equal part of the harmonious cosmological community. Donghak thus advocates equalitarianism, elimination of the selfishness of all, and ecocentrism: ‘The relations among God-human-nature-cosmos are conceived of as relationships of equals without hierarchal strata’. The ontological analysis in this article concludes with the emphasis on co-living and ecological vision for the curricular development of the twenty-first century. Overall, this article presents an overview of Donghak. For those who are unfamiliar with the development of Neo-Confucianism in Eastern Asia in modern times, this article does a fair job of introducing Donghak. Readers may find a strong bond between Donghak and religion. It is interesting to learn that the leader of the third-generation disciples, Son Byeong-hui (1861–1922), changed the name Donghak to Cheondogyo, meaning ‘Religion of the Heavenly Way’, whose doctrine combines Confucianism, religious Daoism (or Daojia) and Korean shamanism. Cheondogyo is still actively practised in modern Korea.
Joseph Sta. Maria’s ‘Acting Without Regarding: Daoist Self-cultivation as Education for Non-dichotomous Thinking’ draws attention to the significance of the Daoist non-dichotomous thinking and the ‘soft’ values. It is insightful for the author to highlight the tension between the ‘soft’ and the ‘hard’ values, or between the ‘higher’ and the ‘lower’ ones. In the Daoist tradition, it seems quite natural to accept the ‘soft’ values and take ‘passive’ attitudes. However, the author aptly pays attention to the Daoist dichotomy of being and nothingness. On one hand, Laozi claims that ‘being and nothingness give birth to each other’ (有無相生); on the other hand, he states, ‘Everything in the world is generated as being and being is generated from nothingness’ (天下萬物生於有，有生於無). The ‘soft’ values—‘nothingness’ and ‘weakness’—are described as the origins of movement and creation. This distinction is a paradoxical dichotomy in Daoist doctrines. As Sta. Maria notes, Laozi and Zhuangzi both assert non-dichotomous thinking as the ideal way of thinking. Learning to think non-dichotomously is the Daoist cultivation. How then can a person learn to think non-dichotomously, on one hand, and accept the ‘soft’ values, on the other hand? The author suggests two ways to answer the question—directly and indirectly. Simply expressed, the ‘direct way’ means to live a simple and frugal life as a preparation for union with Dao. This point is in accordance with our ordinary knowledge of Daoism. In contrast, the ‘indirect way’ could be more interesting. As the author argues, one of the Daoist teachings is the preservation of life with the selflessness of Dao. Think about it more deeply. The preservation of the lives of others implies the flourishing of society. Following the social order and fulfilling social duties help the society thrive and preserve life. In my view, Sta. Maria successfully makes the point that the Daoist non-dichotomous thinking is more socially harmonious and Confucian oriented than it is generally understood.
Robert Shaw and Denghua Yuan’s article, ‘The Purpose of the MBA: The Opportunity for a Confucian MBA to Overcome Neoliberalism’ suggests the Confucian MBA model as an alternative to the mainstream ones—Western, globalised and neoliberal. According to the authors, three MBA models in current higher education include Model 1: analytic skills and knowledge courses, Model 2: soft skill courses and Model 3: leadership courses for senior managers. The authors differentiate Model 1 and Model 2 courses from Model 3 courses. The courses of the first two models aim to cultivate employees whereas the third one’s courses emphasise the development of autonomous leadership. More interestingly, the authors suggest that Model 3 can be divided into two subtypes: Model 3A and Model 3B. Model 3A is based on the Western tradition, and Model 3B follows the Confucian tradition. The Model 3A curricula embrace Western values and concepts, such as modernity, neoliberalism, freedom, individualism, market, capitalism and so on. In contrast, the Model 3B curricula are grounded on Confucian ideas; the most important one is the harmonious alliance among people, the community and society. The authors point out three characteristics of the Confucian MBA model: governmentality, the Chinese enlightenment and academic aspirations. It is worthwhile to think how these Western concepts can be actualised in the Chinese context if the two traditions differ from each other. However, this article manifests the widespread mentality of the Chinese academia that the Western system and measure can be absorbed and adopted in Chinese models. At the practical level, it is not very difficult for Chinese higher educational institutions and universities to appropriate Western inventions such as MBA programmes. At the philosophical level, I am curious about the availability of the appropriation. As the authors claim, if the Chinese model is based on Confucian metaphysics, which is entirely opposite to Western modernity, the sustainability of the appropriation should be called into question. Whether the Confucian metaphysics will be undermined or the appropriation will fall apart in the future, is a pending issue.
Devine Nesta and Qun Ding’s paper, ‘Agency and Social Capital in Chinese International Doctoral Students’ conversion to Christianity’, provides a fresh approach to Chinese students self understanding. The authors conducted in-depth interviews with nine overseas Chinese doctoral students to reveal the factors that influenced the interviewees’ religious conversion. As the study shows, the conversion to Christianity is a gradual process with contributing personal, contextual and social factors. The overseas Chinese students’ religious conversion simultaneously accepts a culture and a tradition that vastly differ from what they had in their homeland. The conversion is mostly related to the experience of being marginalised in the foreign country. They find a place in church where they can build dynamic interactions at individual, institutional and social levels and meet their own psychological and religious needs.
Ruyu Hung
National Chiayi University, Taiwan
ruyuhung@yahoo.co.uk
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00131857.2017.1376438