Welcome
to the special issue that focuses on the theme of self-cultivation in
the East Asian philosophy of education. The cultivation of the self is
always an issue of ultimate concern in the East Asian educational
tradition. Thousands of years ago, Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi, Laozi,
Zhuangzi and many other ancient philosophers all pondered on the meaning
of being a person—what kind of a human being one should be and how one
should develop oneself to be such a person. Their legacy has produced a
unique domain of Chinese or Confucian cultural heritage in East Asia.
The question concerning the self could be unpacked from different
aspects. First, the tradition of Chinese philosophy has emphasised the
emulation of model characters, including junzi (benevolent or noble person) and shenren
(the sage), as the goals of education. However, some interesting
questions are involved. Confucian and Daoist philosophers both adopt the
term shenren, but they may have different references. Does the
divergence lead to different educational ideas and practices? Moreover,
what is the difference between self-conception in Confucian and Daoist
traditions, and between them and Buddhist thought? Do the conceptions of
junzi and shenren still affect current education in
Confucian cultural heritage societies? Are these concepts still taken as
the points of destination of modern education? On the other hand, it
may be the case that the meanings of the conceptions of junzi and shenren
are modernised in some sense. In this regard, the question of what
change could be made in the understanding of self-conception and
education has to be explored. Probing even further, the archaic
conceptions of junzi and shenren could already be
abandoned in modern times. Thus, what kind of human being is taken to
replace the archaic conceptions as the destination of humanistic
education in the modern era that is facing the thrust of globalisation
and internationalisation? Expressed in a more radical way, do the
descendants of Confucius, in blood or in spirit, still need an ideal
human being for their education?
Second, the area influenced by
the tradition of Chinese philosophy is much larger than China in the
political-geographical sense. Local and temporal characteristics may
produce differences in the conception of self in various regions. In the
sphere of pre-modern Chinese cultural heritage, the ideal Confucian
person had different names. In ancient China, the Confucian literati
were called shidaifu. In Tokugawa Japan (1600–1868), they were called jusha; and in Chosen Korea, they were yangban (Huang, Citation2010).The
different conceptions of the Confucian literati from various areas
imply both similarities and dissimilarities, which indicate the
complicated processes of how the Confucian human person is cultivated in
each area with local characteristics.
The perfectibility of the
human being as the cultivation of the self has been thought to be the
common core value of the multifaceted East Asian Confucian humanism for a
thousand years (Huang, Citation2010).
This special issue’s eight-article collection addresses a wide range of
issues in relation to self-cultivation from the East Asian perspective
with diverse, creative and critical views.
Chi-Ming Lam’s
‘Confucianism and Critical Rationalism: Friends or Foes’ lends a new
lens for viewing Confucianism. Lam compares Confucianism with
rationalism and explores their differences and compatibilities. In the
beginning of the article, Lam raises a very interesting question about
whether or not Confucianism can be critical. As Confucius characterises
the hierarchical structure of a harmonious society, it seems to suggest
that Confucianism tends to cultivate ‘a conformist rather than critical
mind’. However, Lam argues that in Confucianism, criticality plays a key
role in self-cultivation. Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi all agree that a
junzi should be critical to himself and others regarding learning. This
interpretation may contradict our current understanding of Confucianism
in relation to the concept of harmony. Since Hu Jintao, the former
president of China, launched the new slogan, ‘harmonious socialist
society’ in 2005 (Choukroune & Garapon, Citation2007; Doutournier & Zhe, Citation2009),
the concept of harmony has been politicised. It is used as a means to
silence different opinions in the society because a harmonious society
is assumed to reach agreement or consensus rather than conduct debates.
Lam has a very stimulating view about harmony: ‘So far as the role of
criticism in Confucianism is concerned, it is to foster harmony between
people of diverse backgrounds in the local and international community’.
‘Harmony in diversity’ is interpreted as the ultimate goal of
Confucianism. This view is based on Confucius’ words: ‘The gentleman
agrees with others without being an echo [heerbutong 和而不同]’. Here, Lam adopts Lau’s (Citation1992) translation of 君子和而不同. Nevertheless, Legge’s (Citation1861)
translation reminds me of a different connotation: ‘The superior man is
affable, but not adulatory’. Lau’s translation focuses on the
substantial content of the agreement or the disagreement. In contrast,
Legge’s translation stresses the person’s attitude or manner. Different
translations have varying implications. On this point, I think there is
still much to explore about the ‘diverse harmony’. Lam concludes with
three major differences between Confucianism and critical rationalism
and thereby suggests a possible reconciliation. Lam’s article shows the
potential of Confucianism in the modern age in the sense that the goal
of the Confucian self-cultivation is to create a person who practises
not only ethical virtues, especially ren (benevolence), but also critical thinking.
‘Is
Filial Piety a Virtue? A Reading of the Xiao Jing (Classic of Filial
Piety) from the Perspective of Ideology Critique’ authored by Hektor Yan
starts with a very fascinating question: Is filial piety a virtue?
Among all virtues, filial piety is held in the highest esteem in Chinese
culture and tradition. In imperial China, filial piety was one of the
most important virtues for the ruler to justify his power to govern.
Even in modern times, political leaders in Chinese heritage cultures
still claim the importance of the Confucian virtues (de). A ruler with de would gain the people’s trust and support and win the consent and loyalty of his subjects. Yan applies Gramsci’s (Citation1992) insight on hegemony to de
in the Chinese moral-political context to reveal that filial piety can
be powerfully effective. Filial piety is generally understood as
children’s obedience and servitude to their parents. In imperial China,
it was extended to the subjects’ obedience and servitude to their
rulers—in a blind and rigid way; therefore, it is criticised. By
adopting Yu’s (Citation2013)
view, Yan argues that filial piety can be a virtue ‘that requires
critical reasoning and it is believed to be pertinent to various social
roles and other interpersonal exchanges’. However, Yan acknowledges that
the emphasis on critical reasoning is not easy to accommodate with
another element of filial piety, which is the tendency of
naturalisation. The author issues a warning in his conclusion. When the
virtue of filial piety is taken as something natural to human society in
a hierarchical way, it can function to maintain the hegemony of rulers.
Weili
Zhao and Caiping Sun’s paper entitled ‘“Keep off the Lawn; Grass Has a
Life Too!”: Re-invoking a Daoist Ecological Sensibility for Moral
Education in China’s Primary Schools’ provides the introduction of
Daoist ecological moral education in the modern world. The authors argue
that the concept of co-being contributes to the formation of a Daoist
ecological sensibility in children’s moral education. Their argument can
be divided into two parts: the theoretical discussion and the analysis
of textbooks. At the theoretical level, the authors use the popular park
sign ‘Keep off the Lawn; Grass Has a Life Too!’ to demonstrate an
age-old Chinese ecological and philosophical belief that human beings
live harmoniously and equally with other living creatures on earth. This
is a Daoist belief in the unity of human beings and nature. Zhao and
Sun also employ Heidegger’s (Citation1969, 1977, 1978)
relational thinking and the concept of co-being to enrich the Daoist
ecological view. As the authors explain, the Daoist–Heideggerian idea of
co-being can lend a lens to examine educational theory and practice.
China’s 2002 Curriculum Standards and textbooks are the main subject
matters of analysis. The analysis reveals that the ethical position
implied in the standards and the textbooks is actually egoistic and
instrumental, not reciprocal, egalitarian and interpersonal. Many
educational materials claim environmental friendliness. However, as the
authors aptly point out, such nature-friendly vocabularies hidden in the
post-2001 textbooks assume a hierarchical and dominant thinking that
human beings are the masters and owners of the natural environment.
Thus, children are taught to build a relationship with others in the way
of hierarchical subject–object duality, which is against the
Daoist–Heideggerian ecological sensibility. However, the
ecological-unfriendliness of the post-2001 textbooks was under review
and revision. China’s primary school textbooks published in 2016 are
redesigned, and the concept of ecological co-being is highlighted. The
authors’ study shows that the tone of instrumental and subject-object
oppositional thinking is minimised in the newly published textbooks and
replaced with the accent of co-being. Phrases such as ‘playing with the
wind’ or ‘thanking our Nature for giving humans presents’ are found in
the textbooks. The implication is no longer the human-master but the
co-existence of the human being and nature. Overall, this article
presents a promising future of moral education with regard to the Daoist
ecological sensibility in China.
Michael Dufresne’s creative
article, ‘The Illusion of Teaching and Learning: Zhuangzi, Wittgenstein
and the Groundlessness of Language’ shows the insightful communication
between Eastern and Western philosophies that presents a new way of
understanding teaching and learning. The author argues that the process
of learning and teaching is not about transmitting knowledge but about
cultivating contextually appropriate habits with the inspirations of
Zhuangzi (Graham, Citation1989) and Wittgenstein (Citation1997, 2001).
His article begins with Zhuangzi’s anecdote about Wheelwright Pian.
Next, Dufresne poses a thought-provoking question about the possibility
that there is nothing to be taught or learned in pedagogical practices.
Based on Zhuangzi’s view, it is not possible to teach something to those
who have no ‘knack’ for it. Dufresne points out that ‘only those who
have the right “stuff” can actually be taught’. What is the ‘knack’ or
the ‘right stuff’? Zhuangzi offers no clear answer. Dufresne relates
Zhuangzi’s ‘knack’ to ‘sudden understanding’ in Wittgenstein’s words.
According to Wittgenstein, there is no standard way of teaching and
learning. Therefore, there is no rule to be taught or learned. One
person cannot learn by following and applying rules because rules are
open to interpretation. Furthermore, interpretation relies on words,
that is, language, which is foundationless and groundless. Rather,
language depends on the convention and the context. According to
Dufresne, neither Zhuangzi nor Wittgenstein believes the essence of
language or truth. The meaning of words always increase and change in
various contexts. Overall, Zhuangzi’s ‘knack’ or the ‘right stuff’, or
Wittgenstein’s ‘sudden understanding’ comes from ordinary daily language
use, which is related to habit formation. Dufresne thus suggests that,
for educators, it is more practical to provide learners with concrete
examples and to help them develop appropriate habits than to teach them
general rules.
Seungho Moon’s distinctive article, ‘Donghak
(Eastern Learning), Self-Other, and Social Transformation: Towards
Diverse Curriculum Discourses on Equity and Justice’ discusses the
meaning of self-cultivation against the background of Donghak and its implications for contemporary curriculum theory. Donghak was a Neo-Confucian movement founded by Choi Je-u (1824–1864) in 1860 in Korea. Donghak,
literally meaning Eastern learning as a reaction to Western learning,
calls for both reform and revival of Confucianism. The doctrine of Donghak as an academic movement integrates ideas concerning theology, philosophy and social activism. Moon outlines Donghak by explaining three concepts: Shi-chun-ju (‘everyone serves God within himself or herself’), Sushim-junggi (self-cultivation) and Gae-byeok
(building of a new world). The three concepts are indeed interrelated
in the sense that the practice of self-cultivation is the process of
serving God to attain the goal of building a harmonious new world—Dong-gui-il-che (the cosmological community). Based on this concept, Moon argues that the teaching of Donghak
sheds light on examining the current curriculum in three aspects: the
self-other hierarchical binary, the purpose of learning, and the
eco-centred curriculum. As Moon explains, in the context of Donghak, everyone as a servant of the God is an equal part of the harmonious cosmological community. Donghak
thus advocates equalitarianism, elimination of the selfishness of all,
and ecocentrism: ‘The relations among God-human-nature-cosmos are
conceived of as relationships of equals without hierarchal strata’. The
ontological analysis in this article concludes with the emphasis on
co-living and ecological vision for the curricular development of the
twenty-first century. Overall, this article presents an overview of Donghak.
For those who are unfamiliar with the development of Neo-Confucianism
in Eastern Asia in modern times, this article does a fair job of
introducing Donghak. Readers may find a strong bond between Donghak
and religion. It is interesting to learn that the leader of the
third-generation disciples, Son Byeong-hui (1861–1922), changed the name
Donghak to Cheondogyo, meaning ‘Religion of the Heavenly
Way’, whose doctrine combines Confucianism, religious Daoism (or Daojia)
and Korean shamanism. Cheondogyo is still actively practised in modern Korea.
Joseph
Sta. Maria’s ‘Acting Without Regarding: Daoist Self-cultivation as
Education for Non-dichotomous Thinking’ draws attention to the
significance of the Daoist non-dichotomous thinking and the ‘soft’
values. It is insightful for the author to highlight the tension between
the ‘soft’ and the ‘hard’ values, or between the ‘higher’ and the
‘lower’ ones. In the Daoist tradition, it seems quite natural to accept
the ‘soft’ values and take ‘passive’ attitudes. However, the author
aptly pays attention to the Daoist dichotomy of being and nothingness.
On one hand, Laozi claims that ‘being and nothingness give birth to each
other’ (有無相生); on the other hand, he states, ‘Everything in the world
is generated as being and being is generated from nothingness’
(天下萬物生於有，有生於無). The ‘soft’ values—‘nothingness’ and ‘weakness’—are
described as the origins of movement and creation. This distinction is a
paradoxical dichotomy in Daoist doctrines. As Sta. Maria notes, Laozi
and Zhuangzi both assert non-dichotomous thinking as the ideal way of
thinking. Learning to think non-dichotomously is the Daoist cultivation.
How then can a person learn to think non-dichotomously, on one hand,
and accept the ‘soft’ values, on the other hand? The author suggests two
ways to answer the question—directly and indirectly. Simply expressed,
the ‘direct way’ means to live a simple and frugal life as a preparation
for union with Dao. This point is in accordance with our
ordinary knowledge of Daoism. In contrast, the ‘indirect way’ could be
more interesting. As the author argues, one of the Daoist teachings is
the preservation of life with the selflessness of Dao. Think about it
more deeply. The preservation of the lives of others implies the
flourishing of society. Following the social order and fulfilling social
duties help the society thrive and preserve life. In my view, Sta.
Maria successfully makes the point that the Daoist non-dichotomous
thinking is more socially harmonious and Confucian oriented than it is
generally understood.
Robert Shaw and Denghua Yuan’s article, ‘The
Purpose of the MBA: The Opportunity for a Confucian MBA to Overcome
Neoliberalism’ suggests the Confucian MBA model as an alternative to the
mainstream ones—Western, globalised and neoliberal. According to the
authors, three MBA models in current higher education include Model 1:
analytic skills and knowledge courses, Model 2: soft skill courses and
Model 3: leadership courses for senior managers. The authors
differentiate Model 1 and Model 2 courses from Model 3 courses. The
courses of the first two models aim to cultivate employees whereas the
third one’s courses emphasise the development of autonomous leadership.
More interestingly, the authors suggest that Model 3 can be divided into
two subtypes: Model 3A and Model 3B. Model 3A is based on the Western
tradition, and Model 3B follows the Confucian tradition. The Model 3A
curricula embrace Western values and concepts, such as modernity,
neoliberalism, freedom, individualism, market, capitalism and so on. In
contrast, the Model 3B curricula are grounded on Confucian ideas; the
most important one is the harmonious alliance among people, the
community and society. The authors point out three characteristics of
the Confucian MBA model: governmentality, the Chinese enlightenment and
academic aspirations. It is worthwhile to think how these Western
concepts can be actualised in the Chinese context if the two traditions
differ from each other. However, this article manifests the widespread
mentality of the Chinese academia that the Western system and measure
can be absorbed and adopted in Chinese models. At the practical level,
it is not very difficult for Chinese higher educational institutions and
universities to appropriate Western inventions such as MBA programmes.
At the philosophical level, I am curious about the availability of the
appropriation. As the authors claim, if the Chinese model is based on
Confucian metaphysics, which is entirely opposite to Western modernity,
the sustainability of the appropriation should be called into question.
Whether the Confucian metaphysics will be undermined or the
appropriation will fall apart in the future, is a pending issue.
Devine
Nesta and Qun Ding’s paper, ‘Agency and Social Capital in Chinese
International Doctoral Students’ conversion to Christianity’, provides a
fresh approach to Chinese students self understanding. The authors
conducted in-depth interviews with nine overseas Chinese doctoral
students to reveal the factors that influenced the interviewees’
religious conversion. As the study shows, the conversion to Christianity
is a gradual process with contributing personal, contextual and social
factors. The overseas Chinese students’ religious conversion
simultaneously accepts a culture and a tradition that vastly differ from
what they had in their homeland. The conversion is mostly related to
the experience of being marginalised in the foreign country. They find a
place in church where they can build dynamic interactions at
individual, institutional and social levels and meet their own
psychological and religious needs.
